Abstract: Open source software production is a successful new innovation model which disproves that only private ownership of intellectual property rights fosters innovations. It is analyzed here under which conditions the open source model may be successful in general. We show that a complex interplay of situational, motivational, and institutional factors have tobe taken into account to understand how to manage the 'tragedy of the commons' as well as the 'tragedy of the anticommons'. It is argued that the success of this new innovation model is greatly facilitated by a well balanced portfolio of intrins ic and extrinsic motivation, low costs for contributors and governa nce mechanisms t hat do not crowd out intrinsic motivation.
Introduct ion
Until r ecently it was undisputed that econ omic development is the m ore successful • the m ore extensive t h e privatisation of production;
• the m ore strongly the state is willing to protect private prop erty rights (e.g . North 1981) . A powerful justifica tion for the privatisation of common goods and st ron g private property rights was given by Garret Hardin's (1968) metaphor of the 'tragedy of the commons' . This m etaphor highlights the problems of overuse a nd undersupply of common resources. U nder certain conditions it might b e n ecessary to change the metaphor to 'tragedy of the a nti-commons' (Michelman 1982; H eller 1998) , in which scatt ered own ers have the right t o exclude others from a scarce r esource while no one h as a n efficient right to use it. If t h e tra n saction cost s to bundle the p rop erty rights a r e too high, such a resource is prone to underuse. This problern might even be worse in the case of intellectual prop e rty rights, e.g. in biomedical r esearch (Heller /Eisenberg 1 998) and the softwa r e industry. This was empirically t ested in a n atural experiment (Bessen / M askin 2000) . Befor e 1980, patent protection for softwa r e was very limited in the United States, as it still is in the EU today. A series of court decisions in the early 1980's extended patent protection considerably. Consequently the number of issued patents increased. However, in cantrast to what was expected, R&D expenditures relative to sales in relevant samples of the software a nd software related industries dropped significantly. The question arises under which conditions private ownership of intellectual property rights in effect hinders innovation and when state regulators should be careful in proliferating patent rights.
Employing the example of one of the most innovative industries, open source software production, we study these conditions. Open source software production is an innovation model which is cha racterized by 1. (partly) public ownership of intellectual property, and 2. user driven distributed innovation.
Some projects like e.g. Linux and Apache managed to attract huge communities of contributors in which intrinsically and extrinsically motivated members volunta rily work tagether in a complementary manner. 1 We will argue that since op en source proj ects h ave n o clear gr oup and resource bounda ries, n or does ther e exist a central for mal a u t h ority, the developme nt a nd maintenance of su ch communities dep en ds on t h eir a bility t o a) develop a nd enforce rules of cooperation in a self-or ganized m a nner , and to b) develop self-enfor cing swift trust w hich is based on gen eralized r eciprocity b etween grou p m embers.
Open source softwar e is the best known but by fa r not the only example of this innova tion mo del. Othe r examp les a re the NASA C lickworkers (a proj ect w h ere volunteers m ark a nd classify cr aters on m aps of Ma r s), Slashdot (a site with 'News for N erds' wh er e users can post su b missions, comment on their content a n d classify the comments themselves as to t h eir h elpfulness) and P r oj ect Gutenberg (peer-based distrib ution of b ooks that includes volunteer scanning of h a rd cop ies a n d p roofreading) (Benkler 2002) . Studying op en source software h elps us to u nderstand w hy a n d w hen private owner ship of intellectual p roperty rights should b e prolifer at ed car efully. Even thou gh the cr eation of ru les in op en source com mu nit ies is la rgely self-or ganized, state r egulators are h eavily involved. T hus the en deavour of this p aper is threefold . Firstly, it studies h ow trust is developed a n d sustained in such v irtual communities of innovation.
Secondly, we a nalyze under wh at con d it ions intellectual commu nities are a ble to develop a nd p ut throu gh their own governance rules. Thirdly, it iden tifies conditions under which p rivat e intellectual p rop ert y rights can hinder innovations. We show t h at state-imposed p rivate property rights can d ra m a tically imp ede this p rocess. State intervention thus may solve on e tragedy but cause a n other.
In the second section of this paper, a short overview of the characteristics of open source software is provided. The third section distinguishes various types of actors in open source software production according to their motivation to contribute to this kind of software. The fourth section discusses the role of trust in overcoming a first and second order social dilemma arising in situations of public good production. We argue that only projects that can be trusted to be able to solve both the first and second order social dilemma are attractive for potential new members and can thus hope to attract a large community. We show that on both levels of the social dilemma, trust based on encapsulated interests (Hardin 2002) is not sufficient, but that the emergence of swift trust based on the existence of a sufficient number of intrinsically motivated contributors is an important condition for the success of such projects. In section five, we analyse under what conditions this is possible. We show that low cost situations and appropriate institutional arrangements that do not destroy intrinsic motivation are essential for building trust that makes "virtual communities of innovation" work without central authorities and privatisation of intellectual property rights, even when no clear group and resource boundaries exist. We then go on to show how state regulation might adversely affect the open source innovation mo del by turning low cost into high cost situations. It is concluded that considering the complex interplay of m otivation al, situational, institutional a nd r egulatory factors, trust a nd motivation issu es sh ould b e given m ore weight in designing prop erty rights. Managers a nd p olicy ma kers should be awar e that the best p olicy n ot always is to blindly apply orthod ox econ omics. Ra ther, they should consider the variety and interplay of existing extrinsic a nd intrinsic motivations and establish conditions under which self-governed ' communities of innovation ' b ased on trust ca n em erge a nd b e sust ained.
What is Open Source Software?
Open source is a collective t erm for software licen ces tha t give t he user t he right to read the source code of the software. Users a r e also allowed t o change the source code a nd to publish these a m endments with the original or the ch a n ged source cod e. Furthermore, one is not allowed to r aise a ny licen ce fees or oth er fees for the source code. The op e n source software code thus constitutes a public good in the classical sense. Linux, Apache a nd Sendmail are three of the most fa mous examples of this very successful innovation model. Linux as a server op erating env ironment already h olds 13.7% of the $50.9 billion market for serve r compute rs . This sha r e is exp ected t o rise even further during the next years (Businessweek 2003) . In J a nuary 2003 the open source web server Apache was used by over 65% of active server s across all d omains. It received many industry awards for excellence.
2 Sendmail r outes at least 42% of mails in the Internet. In comparison, Microsoft as the closest competitor only h olds a market share of 18%. 3 SourceForge.net, a repository of open source projects, lists more than 50.000 projects and more than 550.000 registered users.
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To explain the success of the new innovation model, one must take into consideration three interlinked characteristics that ensure an efficient concurrence of design and testing in open source software production. These characteristics, which make open source programs moreinnovative and robust tha n proprietary programs (Kogut/ Metiu 2001) , will be discussed in t urn: a) Open source software is produced under licences that assure (partly) public ownership by allowing:
• to read and have access to the software's source code as a necessary first step before one can change it ,
• to make copies a nd to distribute those copies,
• to modify the program and distribute modified versions. In the special case of the GNU General Public License, the modified versions have to be published under the same terms as the original softwa re (Stallman 1999) .
The various open source licen ces differ to the extent t o w hich they allow pub lic p rop er t y to b e mixed with private prop e rty r ights. One of the m ost far reaching is the GNU Gen eral Public Licen ce (GPL). It for ces ever y pr ogra m that contains a free softwar e comp on en t to b e r eleased in its entiret y as fr ee software. In cont r ast t o the conven tional copyright, this licen ce is called "copyleft" . It ' infects' the open source software w ith a 'v irus' t o enforce complia nce to the copyleft . T hus, it is en sured tha t a ny derived soft warewill re main a pub lic good. Other licen ses, like Apache's, allow p rogr amm ers to make their modifications private a n d distribute them as prop rietary products. T his blen d ing of op en and proprieta r y source, h owever , is sometimes con demned as a threat to the ideals of the op en source community (St allma n 1999) . b) User driven distributed knowledge production in rapid feedb ack cycles imp le ments con currence in design a nd testing of softwar e modules a nd thus e nables a ver y efficient n ew pro duct development process. In traditional software pr od uction, the software is usually sold in a form giv ing no access to the source code. C ustom ers ther efor e h ave only limited possibilities to d etect mist a kes ('debugging ') a nd to impr ove the program. The y can only give feedback t o t h e seller a b out a ny malfunctions . In contrast, in op en source software pr oduction, progra m innovation s a r e disclosed to t he users. A la rge a u d ie nce tests t h e program, d ebu gs it during use and gives immediate feedback. This is the r eason w hy op en source software is consider ed t o h ave a lowe r d efect density tha n p ropriet a ry software: "given en ough eyeb alls, all b ugs a r e shallow" (Raym ond 2001 ) . The user d riven r a pid feedback cycles work not only with de bugging but also with t h e pr oduction of wh ole m odules. These a r e con t ributions to t h e sou rce code w hich a r e published and r ev iewed by p eers b efor e t hey b ecome pa r t of t he next release of the softwar e.
c) Successful open source projects form voluntary 'virtual communities of innovation '. 5 . Following Tönnies (1920) communities are defined as groups of people whose actions are geared towards a collective goal. This differentiates eommunities from soeieties, whieh are abstraet entities and in which interaetions are eharaeterized by the rational pursuit of individualized goals. In eontrast, membership in a eommunity is based on a feeling of belonging and shared values. This firstly ensures intensive network embeddedness based on a strong common culture. Secondly the members of these communities have a eommon know how on an expert level without having faee-to-faee interaetion. In eontrast to proprietary software, the users of open souree software are often more sophisticated. Thirdly, Benkler (2002) argues that in virtual communities of innovation, transaetion eosts of matehing talents to tasks ean be reduced dramatically eompared to market or hierarehical modes of organization. Individuals can judge for themselves in whieh tasks their talents might be put to most efficient use. This voluntary matehing not only avoids information losses whieh are eharacteristie for market transactions and within firms, due to incomplete contracts. It also strengthens intrinsie motivation as a result of the autonomy of individuals. 
Multiple Type s of Contributors to Open Source Software
Why should thousands of programmers eontribute freely to the provision of a publie good? T wo alternative expla nations a r e diseussed.
• Is it the r esult of the eolla b or a tion of self-inte rested indiv id uals who invest in their reputa tion (e.g. Lerner/ Tirole 2002a) The t wo alte rna tive explanation s refer to a distine tion b etween two kinds of motivation (Deci/ Ryan 2000; Frey 1997; O sterloh / Frey 2000) : Extrinsic m otivation works throu gh indireet satisfaetion of n eed s, most importa ntly t hrou gh monet a ry compensation. Intrinsic m otiva tion works through immediate need satisfaction. An activ ity is valued for its own sake and appears to be selfsustained. The ideal ineentive syste m for intrinsie motiva tion eonsists in the w ork contents itself.
Int rinsie m otivation h as two dimensions. Following Lindenberg (2001) , one ean diffe rent iate b etween enjoyment-b ased and obligation-b ased intrinsie m otivation.
• Enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation is the incentive focused on by Deci and his group (Deci et al. 1999) . It refers to a satisfying flow of activity (e. g. Csikszentmihalyi 1975 ) such as playing agame or reading a novel for pleasure.
• Obligation-based intrinsic motivationwas introduced by Frey (1997) as a further important form of incentives. Empirical field evidence for the relevance of obligation-based rules are tax morale and environmental ethics, or organizational citizenship behavior (e.g. Organ 1995).
We will argue that in the open source community there exist a variety of ideal types of contributors with different extrinsic and intrinsic motives. 7 In this section, we will distinguish five different types of contributors according to their motives. In reality, these types are overlapping (Hars/ Ou 2002; Lakhani et al. 2002) .
Commercial Service Providers
Commercial service providers make money with open source software in spite of the fact tha t op en source software is a public good. The most prominent ex a mple is Red H a t. This compa ny does not actu ally sell the source cod e (w hich a nybod y can download from the Internet for free). Inst ead, it sells support and serv ices. In addition, it adds value by integr a ting a utonomous op e n source components into a working and r elia ble op erating system that can easily b e installed by inexperie nced user s. Other commercial firms like Hewlett Packa rd sell hardware, like printer s, a nd contribute add -ons, like printer driver s, to make their products work with op en source softwa re. Finally, compa nies like IBM cont ribute t o op en source software by ma king their ha rdware compa tible with it. These firms a re a bsolutely vital for the widespread adop tion of this kind of softwar e, b ecause the inexp e rienced con sume r get s relia ble serv ices and add-on s, thus h elping to drive these program s into the mainstream (Kogut/ Metiu 2000) .
Software Customize rs
Contributor s to op en source ca n gain n on-mon etary b e nefit s b y tailoring the software to their own n eed s (von Hippel 1988; von Hippel/von Krogh forthcoming) . They fo llow the saying "if you w ant som ething clone right , do it yourself'' (La kha ni/ von Hippel fort hcoming). They h ave sufficient incentives to contribute to a n innovation whe n they exp ect the p ersonal b en efits to exceed their costs.
Why should the b en efits of publishing on e's improvem ents on the Internet exceed the costs of r evealing information ? It is a rgu ed that, fi rstly, publication op ens up the p ossibility tha t other users might work with the a me ndme nts of the cod e, m aintain and develop them. Tha t includes the elimina tion of possible errors (e.g . v on Hippel2001; Lerne r/ Tirole 2002a). Secondly, the Interne t makes it p ossible for a software d evelop er t o access a wide a u dien ce with very low costs.
Because publication costs are small, publication on the Internet can pay off even if the expectations for helpful comments from other users are relatively low. Besides, the gains the developer reaps from the newly developed functionalities are not diminished by additional users.
Reputation Investors
Contributors can make money indirectly by signaHing their ability in the open source community which can then be turned into money through employment by a commercial software company or through easier access to venture capital. Employers or venture capitalists can take the reputation of a programmer as a signal for his/ her abilities which would otherwise be hard to identify. It is argued that in open source projects reputation can be more easily made visible than in proprietary projects due to the system of files that list people who made contributions, and due to the public nature of mailing list archives (Lerner/Tirole 2002a; Moonj Sproull 2000) . This system makes open source production comparable to the production of researchinan academic community where reputation is madevisible through citations. As in the academic community, strong norms exist regarding the public validation of innovative results .
Homo Ludens
While commercial serv ice providers, software customize rs a nd r eputa tion inv est ors are extrinsically m otivat ed , much eviden ce exists tha t for m a ny progra mmers the work itself is intrinsically rewarding. This idea corresponds to Huizinga's (1986) homo ludens, the playful huma n tha t receives som e form of b en efit simply from carry ing out the programming or from d ealing with a softw are problem. In tha t case, contributions to the open source code are not a cost but a b en efit , n ot investment but consumption. Importa nt con t ributors to op en source software rep ort that they are doing the p rogramming "just for fun" and the public displa y of one's a bilities (Torvalds/Diamond 2001).
8 As Ray mond (2001) puts it: "We're proving n ot only t h a t we can d o b et ter software, but tha t joy is a n asset" (see also Brooks 1995) . Writing or d ebugging softwar e is p erceived as a "fl.ow experien ce" (Csikszentmihalyi 1975) . M ore tha n 70% of op en source d evelop ers r ep ort that they lose track of time w hile progra mming (La khani et al. 2002) . As Ullma n (1 997) show s, progra mmer s oft en exp erien ce a stron g p er sonal sa tisfaction from cr ea ting 'some thing tha t works'. This kind of m otivation is faste red b y volunta ry work without time pressure (Deci et al. 1999) . C r eativity a nd motivation to v olunteer in unpaid h elping activ ities a re higher whe n the external pressure is low (Stukas et al. 1999; Amabile et al. 2002) . Not being subj ected to d elivery d eadlines is a n important cha r acteristic of op en source proj ects (Raymond 2001) .
Members of the Tribe
The open source community is often described as a gift-culture instead of an exchange culture (e.g. Raymond 2001) . A gift is characterized by receiving no tangible rewards but psychological benefits such as the 'warm glow' of sympathy or the satisfaction of living up to a moral commitment (Rose-Ackerman 1998). Gift-giving reveals the motivations of altruism or generalized reciprocity. Open source contributors report that they like the sense of 'helping others' or ' giving something back' to like-minded others (Faraj/ Wasko 2001). Norms of generalized reciprocity sustain kindness as a social institution and lead people to provide help (Constant et al. 1996) . Thesemotivationsare apart from transactional exchange relationships, because the receiver is often unknown to the giver. Participants report that "the person I help may never be in the position to help me, but someone else might be" (Rheingold 1993) . People seem to reply to the entire group when answering an individual question (Wellman/ Gulia 1999) . The good of the community enters into the preferences of the individual contributor. Thus a reciprocal trust based on shared values and on warm feelings towa rds the group is existing (Rose-Ackerman 2001) , ra ther than trust based on en capsulated interests (Ha rdin 2002) .
The belief t h at it is the right t hing to give software away as a common good leads to the corolla ry tha t private own ership of intellectual property can b e damaging . 9 The open source m ovement seems to b e fuelled to som e ext ent by the aim to destr oy Microsoft's m onop oly (e.g. Ma rkus et al. 2000; Raymond 2001) . Member s of the tribe thus produce a public good of t wo different orders.
Firstly, they contribute t o the functionality and quality of t h e progr ams (first order public good). Secondly, they are en gaged in monitoring a nd san ctioning activities to ensure that the source code stays open (second order public good 10 ) .
This includes a h eated disc ussion between various fr agm ents of the open source community on wh a t kind of licence best supports these moral con cerns. While some b elieve that only the GN U General Public Licen ce gua rantees that source code remains open, others feel t hat the viral effect of this licence actually reduces freedom.
g Empiric al eviden ce about the importance of this motive w ithin the open source community is ambivalent. Accor ding t o G h osh et al. 38% of open source develop er s r eport that their motivation t o contribute t o the community is th eir b eli eving in that software should not be a propri et ary good (Gh osh et al. 2002) . In a different survey, Lakhani et al. 2002 find that 11% of open source developers are driven by the m otivation t o beat proprietary software. The differen ce might be expla.ined by different samples and m eth odology. As always on e h as t o be careful t o ta.ke data b ased on self-rep orts at face-value du e to possible social desirability biases. However , a s h eated discussions on the Internet about license t erms and the examples discu ssed in chapter 5. 1 sh ow, a significant part of the community demonstr ates their con cem s ab out keeping the source code open very actively.
10 For first and second order public goo ds see section 4.
Complementarity of the Different Types
We showed that in the open source community different types of motivation among the contributors exist. In the following we argue that these different types do not only coexist but are complementary to each other. Intrinsically motiva ted 'fun seekers' and 'members of the tribe' play an especially important role during the starting phase of open source projects. In this phase a usable product does not yet exist and the risk of project failure is very high. The enthusiasm of intrinsically motivated contributors helps these projects to gain enough momentum. In that way, they reduce the costs for extrinsically motivated contributors so that contribution becomes more attractive for them (Bessen 2002; Franck/ Jungwirth 2003) . Without intrinsically motivated contributors
• commercial service providers would lack the basis of their business. They make money on support only if the open source software is successful.
• software customizers would have to make higher set up investments so that the costs a r e m ore likely to exceed the b enefits .
• reputation investors would n ot b e able to pr oduce m a rket a ble sign als . Employers a nd venture capitalists a re only att racted by su ccessful projects t h at have already produced a critical m ass of source code. 11
On the oth er ha nd t h e success of op e n source softwa re is d epende nt on extrinsically m otivated contributors . Commer cial p layers, software c ustomizers or reputation invest ors trigger a lever age effect :
• If the op en source m ovem ent wer e solely based on intrinsic m otiv ation, the pr oducts would n ot b e linked the way they a re to the needs of t h e users. A disadvantage over commercial development might result.
• Inexp erien ced consum ers could n ot use t his kind of software which was originally designed by a nd for experts .
So fa r , it is n ot known w hich prop ortion of intrinsically a nd extrinsically m otiva ted people exist. But ther e a r e some prelimina ry empirical find ings a b out w h at presently drives op en source progr amm ers a nd p a rticipant s of n ewsgroups. In an empirical study w ith participants of a user-to-user Apache field su p port syst em Lakha ni and von Hip pel (forthcoming) r ep ort gener alized reciprocity as t h e m ost agreed-wit h st atem ent ( "I have been helped b efore, so I recipr ocate", "I h elp now so I will b e h elped in the future" ) , followed by identification with 11 T h e decision of r eputation invest or s t o join a proj ect in its starting ph ase dep ends on th eir attitude t owards risk taking . While risk adverse reputation investors w ill wait and see h ow a pr oject develop s before decidin g t o join, reputation investor s w ith risk seekin g p referen ces might b e willing to join before it is clear wh ether the p roject w ill be a su ccess or a failure. In b oth cases, h owev er, t he risk that th e r eputa tion investor h as to take is lower th e hlgh er th e nurnber of intrinsically motivated contr ibutor s. We thank an anonym aus refer ee for h elp in clarifying t hls p oint . the community ("I answer to promote open source software"). These self-reports might emphasize 'socially correct' answers. Observable behaviour however supports these claims. The same empirical study found that in one of the Usenet newsgroups 57% asked questions only (and can thus be classified as free riders), 21% both asked questions and gave answers (they can be classified as reciprocators), and 22% provided answers only. Whether they do that to invest in their reputation or for altruistic reasons cannot be established by the data. Taking into account other empirical work one may conclude that extrinsic and intrinsic motivation exert about the same influence (Ghosh et al. 2002; Hars/ Ou 2002) .
The Role of Trust in Open Source Communities
In open source extrinsically and intrinsically motivated contributors work together in a complementary manner to produce a public good. In the absence of a central authority that has the power to enforce contribution, the presence of extrinsically motivated utility-maximizers usually leads to an undersupply and overuse of public goods due t o free-riding. This problern is known in the liter atme as the social dilemma: Social d ile mmas a rise if the actions of selfinte rested individuals do not lead t o socially desirable outcomes (Dawes 1980; O st rom 1998) . The consequ ence might be a ' t r agedy of the commons' as H a rdin (1968) described it, wh er e the public good is not produced a t all. But why do we n ot observe t his problern in op en source? In this chapter we turn t o t he r ole of trust a nd intrinsic motivation in overcoming the social dilemma in open source.
In open source, the social dilemma is located on diffe rent levels. On the first level free riding can t a ke place w ith respect to the production of software itself, b ecause open source software constitutes a public good. Since n obody can be excluded from open source softwa re, there is a problern of undersupply.
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On the second level, t h e rules of t h e gam e that prevent first order free riding have to b e observed a nd san ctioned. The worst kinds of first order free riding a re n ot h onouring the t erms of the licence, using open source compon ents in proprieta r y commercial products without giving a nything back to the community or not citing or rem oving the cr edits of a contributor. As Raymond (2001) p oints out "surrep titiously filing someon e's name off a project is, in cultural context, one of the ultimate crimes" . Second orde r free riding is r ela ted t o the m onitoring of the compliance to the op en source software norms and to the a pplication of sanctions that prevent first order free riding . Reprimanding rule brea kers in order to enforce the code of ethics is itself a public good a nd thus constitutes a social dilemma of a high er order: "Punishment almost invariably is costly to 12 In newsgroups thl s kind of free ricling is known as lurking . Thls rneans r eacling ongoing cli scu ssions without contributing . Lurking is usually not r e ally a problern as long as enough inclividuals are willing to contribute, b ecause there is no rivalry in con sumption. But there can exist a rivalry in a ttention, due t o excessive crossposting and trolling. G iven the huge amount of information that is transferred, it is critical that contributor s r espect the focus of the problerntha t is dealt with and therefore avoid cr ossp osting (Kollock/Srnith 1996) . Trolling refers to d eliberately p ost ing rnessages with n o other a.irn than t o provoke other u sers. the punisher, while the benefits from punishment are diffusely distributed over all members. It is, in fact, a public good" (Elster 1989, 41) .
As we will show trust is necessary on both levels to enhance 'Swift trust' describes a form of trust that is found in teams that only work together for a limited period of time and do not have the opportunity to develop trust based on personal relationships and mutual control. Members of such temporary teams decide on how much they think they can trust the others even before actually joining the team. This decision is based on stereotypical social categories and on a subjective appraisal of the intrinsically motivated adherence to mutual n orms of reciprocity within a community.
We differentia t e b etween t wo differ ent types of swift trust: trust b ased on encapsulated interests (H a rdin 2002) a nd cognitive t rust which is b ased on knowled ge about the characte ristics of the trust ees, e. g. their dominating (intrinsic or extrinsic) m otivation (Lewicki/ Bunke r 1995). Trust based on encapsulated int erests m eans that I trust someb ody because I believe it is in the trust ee's (i.e. the trusted person's) b est p ersonal interest n ot to d eceive my trust. This kind of trust is based on a n estima tion of the situation in which a n interaction ta kes place. G iv en this sp ecific situa tion, d o I b elieve that the other p erson h as en ough incentives to b e have trust wort hy? Coqnitive trust, on the other ha nd, is b ased on an estimation of the cha r acteristics of the p erson I interact with. Do I b elieve that a person will h onour my trust even if it would b e in their best p er son al interest not to d o so? In the op en source context cognitive trust means trust tha t there a re a sufficient number of intrinsically m otivat ed contributors in a given proj ect. The trustor hirnself might well b e extrinsically m otivat ed , i.e. h e might cont rib ute to the op en source community in a n instrume ntal wa y.
The developme nt of trust is esp ecially importa nt for potential new membe rs, b ecause the y will only b e willing to join a project which they b elieve is a ble to solve the first a nd second order social dilemmas in a sustainable way. We will n ow discuss the social dile mmas in op en source in turn.
As it turns out, t h e solution of the first order social dilemma is n ot a big proble rn in op en source. As w e sh owed in chapter 3, contribution t o open source project s is not a pure public good. The different types of contributors all h ave indiv idual incentives to participa te which m a ke the contribution option m ore w orthwhile for them tha n m erely free-riding. This h olds for extrinsically as well as intrinsically m otiva ted contributor s. If en ough p eople w ith sufficient individual incentives exist, the social dilemma is transformed into a coordina tion game w h ere m ore tha n on e equilibrium exists (Se n 19 74). In a coordina tion game, the production of a public go od mainly depends on the estima tion of p otential con-t r ibutors, how many others will contribute as well. This is equivalent to saying that the contribution decision depends on the amount of trust based on encapsulated interests, i.e. the belief that it is in the personal interest of a sufficient number of other potential contributors to participate.
But even on this level trust based on encapsulated interests alone is not enough. As we showed in chapter 3.6., especially in the beginning phase of a project, success is very much facilitated by a high number of intrinsically motivated participants. This means that also on the level of the first order social dilemma, cognitive trust in the intrinsically motivated trustworthiness of a relevant part of the community is a very important condition.
Potential new members can estimate the trustworthiness of a community simply by observing its behaviour. Due to the publicity of the Internet they are able to judge whether norms of generalized reciprocity are lived up to within a community before deciding to join. For example they can observe whether members offer mutual support, provide helpful remarks to each other and answer questions in newsgroups.
Thus the first order social dilemma in open source can be solved even in the p resen ce of purely extrinsically motivated t rust or s. Unfortuna tely, this kind of cooper a tion is r ath er unsta ble. As soon as golden opportunities a rise, selfinte rest m aximizing egoists cannot be counted on their cooperation a nym ore. This is the reason wh y the enfor ceme nt of coop er ation rules is so imp orta nt. They p rotect the communit y from exploitation by opportunists w ho face a golden op portunity.
Second order social dilemmas of rule enforcem ent can be solved without a cent r al a uthority if a su fficie nt number of obligation-based intrinsically m otiva t ed p eople exist w ho a r e prepared t o punish rule-breaker s even if such punishment is costly to the m. Labarator y empirical eviden ce for t h e existen ce of such p eople can b e found in one-sh ot public good games (Cam erer /Fehr forthcoming; Ledyard 1995) . In the open source community, these sanctions take p lace by v iolently blaming individuals on the Internet, called 'flaming'. Fla ming is n ot simply a way of punishing rule-breakers, but also h as a n expressive function in assuring users tha t others a re doing t h eir part in usin g t h e public good w isely (K ollock/S mith 1996) . 1 3 Other san ctions a r e the public a nnouncemen t of 'killfiling' (st a ting tha t on e doesn 't want t o r eceive mails from a sp ecific person ) or sh unning ( deliberately refusing to resp ond ).
Monita ring the b eh avior of participants is oft en easy in the op en source community because the Internet gives full t r a nspa r en cy.
14 Sanctioning, h owever , is mor e of a ch allen ge. Firstly, m a ny san ctions (like flaming) are informal in n at u re. Secondly, the com munity memb ers a re often a n ony ma us a nd n o clear grou p a n d r esource boundaries exist. Insofar the condit ions in op en source communities are differe nt from the communities O strom (1990) h as a nalysed. Sh e a rgues that only if clearly defined group a n d r esource b oundaries exist, self governance of the commons can be successful. Nevertheless in the open source community self governance works. It is reported that sanctions have a significant effect on behaviour (Kollock/ Smith 1996) though these sanctions often do no actual harm. They can influence behaviour indirectly however by damaging the sanctioned member's reputation or by inducing shame. In these cases, one has to assume that not only the sanctioner, but also the sanctioned person must be intrinsically committed to obligation-based rules. Purely extrinsically motivated egoists would not feel any shame (Elster 1999; Orr 2001) . It can be concluded that the solution of the second order social dilemma in open source software production is greatly facilitated by the presence of intrinsically motivated trustees. Again, potential new members judge the trustworthiness of a community by observing its behaviour. If the existence of intrinsic motivation facilitates the development of swift trust and the complementary interaction of the different types of contributors to open source software, the question arises, under which conditions the required amount of intrinsic motivation and trust can exist and be maintained.
The Antecedents of Swift Trust in Open Source Projects
We sh owed that different kinds of trust a r e n eed ed on the t rustor 's and the trustee's side. On the trustor's side, extrinsically motiva ted trust b ased on en capsulated interests is sufficient. In contrast , on the trust ee's side, there must exist a sufficient number of intrinsically motivated contributor s as a precondition for the developme nt of swift trust on the trustor's side. The problern therefore b oils d own t o the question, under what conditions the trustor w ill judge the probability tha t a sufficient a m ount of intrinsic motivation exists and can b e maintained as high. We identify two antecedents: Firstly, institutions must be created tha t ensure tha t the existing intrinsic m otivation of the trustees is n ot d estroyed. Secondly, even intrinsically m otivated m ember s will not contribute to a public good if the costs of doing so are high. Thus keeping the contribution cost s low is the second anteced ent of swift trust. We the n go on t o sh ow that state inte rvention can disturb the equilibrium between int rinsically a nd extrinsically motivated contributors by turning low cost into high cost situations.
The Institutional Level: Initial Intrinsic Motivation Must Not be Crowde d Out
It is h a rd to a nalyze the reasons why p eople d evelop a n initial sense of fun for or a commitment to certain proj ects. But we know the institutional conditions under which initial intrinsic motivation is crowd ed out (undermined) or crowd ed in (strengthened) by external interven tions (FreyjOsterloh 2002) . Two conditions are relevant for the r equired institutional governance mechanisms to foste r the n ew innovation model: self-determination (1) a nd conditional coop eration (2). 1) Self-determinati on: External interventions crowd out intrinsic motivation if the indiv iduals affected perceive them to b e controlling. In that case selfdetermination and self-esteem suffer and the indiv iduals r eact by shifting their 'locus of causality' from inside to outside. In contrast, intrinsic motivation is crowded in if a person's feelings of self-determination are enhanced. ( In open source projects self determination is enhanced for two reasons. Firstly, contributors choose for themselves where and what they wish to contribute (Benkler 2002; for empirical evidence see von Krogh et al. 2002) . Secondly, a variety of self governance mechanisms give contributors large possibilities to participate in collective decision making in a transparent way. Extensive experimental and field research show that civic virtues are strengthened by procedural utility (Benz et al. forthcoming; Frey /Stutzer 2002; Osterloh et al. 2002) and that 'organizational citizenship behavior' is strengthened by participation and procedural fairness (e.g. Organ/Ryan 1995). Though governance rules in open source projects differ to a great extent (for an overview see Markus et al. 2000) , open source contributors submit themselves voluntarily to these rules without any contract.
2) Conditional cooperation: Empirical evidence shows that many individuals contribute voluntarily t o public good s in social dilemmas as lon g as som e other indiv iduals cont ribute also. They a r e condition al co op era t ors (Fischbach er e t al. Levi 1988; Ostrom 2000) . K D E (K D esktop E nv ironment) gives a n impressive example of how conditional coop era tion can b e undermined. KDE is a W indows-like d esktop for Linux a n d other op en source op erating systems d evelop ed by the op en source community. It is b ased on a graphical interface t oolkit called Q t. Q t was developed by Trolltech , a commercial software firm. It d id not comply w ith t h e requireme nts of op en source (S tallma n 1999) . Even t h ough the Linux community agr eed tha t KDE was a t echnically excellent pr oduct , m a ny me mbers refused to en dorse it because t h ey d idn' t agree w it h the te rms of the Qt licen ce. These m ember s sta rted a p arallel project called GNOME tha t is distributed under copyleft. Finally Trolltech relucta ntly relicensed their p ro duct. B y now Q t is availa ble u nder a copy left license.
Two consequ ences t o maintain con ditional coop era tion follow. Firstly, intrinsic m otivation is crowded ou t by free riders . Ther efore institutional governa n ce mech anism s must b e set in place w hich hinder exploitation of volunta r y don ors. Open source licen ces, in particula r copyleft , are such institutional m echa nism s (Franck/ Jungwirt h 2003) . T h ey impose t o contribu tors as well as to free rider s w h at Ha n sm a nn (1980) calls the n ondistrib ution constraint w hich is ch a ract eristic for non profit organizations (Rose-Ackerman 1996): Volu nta ry contributions cannot be r edistributed a m on g t h ose wh o have a main impact on the organiza tion. The nondistribu tion constraint is a ma jor institution al precondition for v oluntary don ations t o or ganizations. It is t he reason why instit utions like the Red C ross or most universities a r e governed as n on p rofit organizations. Also for commercial provider s wh o a r e dep en dent on the goodwill of the develop e rs, it is crucial t o commit cr edibly to t h e n on distribution con straint and n ot t o a ppropria te the joint project in a n unfair ma nner (Fra nck/ Jungwirth 2003) . Otherw ise condit ional coop eration b reaksdown a nd t heir business mo del w ill fail (Benkler 2002) .
Red Hat has submitted itself voluntarily to constraints beyond the obligations of the open source license to strengthen conditional cooperation: As mentioned, Red Hat does not sell the Linux code. Instead, it sells support, services and value added by assembling and testing a running operating system that is compatible with other products carrying the same brand. After a short while, other CD-ROM distributors were advertising the same CD-ROM for a considerably lower price than Red Hat charged for its product. Even if Red Hat does not own intellectual property rights on the entire source code distributed on their CD-ROM, they do have the copyright on parts of the CD. How did Red Hat react? The somewhat astanishing answer is: not at all. The managers of Red Hat argued that the norms of the open source community precluded any claim on private property rights on their product. Since Red Hat is dependent on the goodwill of the open source community, it adheres to rules which foster conditional cooperation.
Secondly, as experiments about conditional cooperation show, intrinsic motivation is crowded out if the existing rules of cooperation in a public good situation, e.g. the rules of nondistribution, are disregarded (Fischbacher et al. 2001) . Therefore rule breaking must b e hindered. Rule breaking can b e made mor e difficult if cost s for m onita ring a nd san ctioning a re low. As me ntioned, monita ring in open source softwar e p roduction is easy due to the publicity of the Internet. Also, san ctioning by fla mingor kill-filing is a low cost activ ity. But it seems r easonable to assume t h at in particular a non yma us d efect ors a r e n ot v ulne rable by san ctions. In these cases, sanctioning is only insofa r effective as defectors in the op en source community still feel a minimum of intrinsically m otivated shame. Because informal graduated sanctions h ave a strong expressive function, they a re very suita ble not to crowd out shame by alienating p eople from t h e community (Kollock/Smith 1996; Orr 2001; Ostrom 1990 ).
Low Cast Situations: Economy of Virtue
Why d oes pro duction flourish in op en source proj ects b ased on the intrinsic motivation of ma ny p eople? Why do othe r fields like the pha rmaceutical or bio-medical industry not a pply this m od el? The simple answer is tha t this production mod el only works in situa tions in which the b en efits exceed t h e costs. This is also true for intrinsic b enefits . Even among intrinsically motivated d on ators , ma rtyrs a nd sain ts a r e in shor t supply. Don ators a re m ore willing to contribute if the p rivate opportunity costs are not too high (Rose-Ackerma n 2001, 553) , thus 'economizing on v irtue ' (Ackerma n 1993, 198) . A ccording to North (1990, 43) there isa downward sloping dem a nd curve formor al concerns. The more costly it gets, the less people contribute. On the other h a nd, if there exists a low cost situation, m a ny people contribute small bits t o t h e public good so tha t the total amount of contributions rises consider a bly (Kirch gässn er 1992; Klie mt 1982).
We distinguish two differ ent asp ects: The cost s and b enefits of actually producing the co de and the costs and b en efits of revealing it to the community. Even thou gh these asp ects a r e intermingled , we will n ow consider the m in turn. 1) For the actual production of the source code, two conditions which are often found in system product industries are beneficial for the costj benefit ratio, namely sequential and complementary innovation processes (Bessen/Maskin 2000; Somaya 2003 ).
• Sequential means that each successive invention builds on the preceding one, in particular that there are incremental, not radical steps of innovation. This allows users and contributors to amortize their initial investments in project specific human capital over several rounds of innovation, thus keeping costs low.
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• Innovation is complementary if several inventors, by following somewhat different research lines, enhance the overall probability that a certain problern is solved or, more generally, an innovation arises. This can be explained by internal dynamic economies of scales alongside trajectories, which help to concentrate successful search to a narrow field. Thus, if the efforts of an actor further the chances of discovery sufficiently, potential benefits are enhanced and this actor has an incentive to contribute to the process of discovery even if, in principle, sh e could wait until someone else makes the invention. The impact of such trajectories is of greater weight during the p eriod of exploration than during exploitation (March 1991 ) , because in that period uncertainty is mor e important.
2) Software is an a rea wh ere the monetary costs of revealing innovations compa r ed t o the benefits are oft en quite low. Ther e a r e t wo kinds of m oneta ry costs to b e con sidered. Firstly, cost s of diffusion are low. Participants simply p ost their contributions on the a ppropriate Internet site . Secondly, the losses st emming from sh a ring intellectual property rights by using a n open source license a re often low compa red t o the gains from the expect ed feedback by other participants.
In low cost situations, cha n ces that ma ny p eople are sufficiently intrinsically motivated to contribute their bit t o the first a nd second order public goods a re high er. Trusta rs have more r eason to b elieve tha t the social dilemmas on b oth levels will be solved within a community. In the n ext section we sh ow tha t state inte rvention may well turn low into high cost situa tions, thus undermining the n ecessary a ntecedents of b oth trust b ased on encapsulated interests and cognitive trust in the intrinsically motivat ed trust worthiness of a sufficient number of contributors.
The Impact of Stat e Regulation: Turning Low Cost into High Cost Situations
As we sh owed, op en source software p ro duction challenges convention al econ omists' wisdom tha t innovations are b etter supported the more they a r e protected by private intellectual property rights (e.g. North 1981) . We sh owed tha t in many open source projects the problern of underprovision seems to have been overcome by a complex interplay of extrinsically and intrinsically motiva ted contributors. 16 This interplay depends on the one hand on institutions that do not crowd out intrinsic motivation and on the other hand on low cost situations which keep the costs ofintrinsically motivated moral behaviour within reasonable limits. However, state intervention could very well darnage the future success of this new innovation model. Software production is an example of collective production in which private property rights might even cause a 'tragedy of the anti-commons' (Heller 1998; Heller/ Eisenberg 1998) . If property rights on a resource are scattered among many parties and the transaction costs to bundle the property rights are too high, this resource is prone to underuse. 17 In the case of intellectual property rights exclusion is made possible by patents. While patents are intended to further innovation by enabling innovators to collect the rents on their investment, in some cases they are used solely to block competitors from using an innovation.
New software is usually based on existing programs and develops them further. Some authors even go as far as to sta te that software development today is impossible w ithout infringeme nt of intellectual p roperty held by some other p a rty (Bessen 2002) .
For op en source softwar e p roduction , t h e p otential effects of p atent p rot ection a r e even wor se tha n in propriet a r y software produ ction for several r eason s. Firstly, since op en source softwar e develop ers cannot make m oney w ith their progra m s as su ch, they simply cannot afford t o st a nd up in legal fights about p a t ent infringem ents (B essen 2002) . 18 Secondly, especially in syst ems produ ct industries like the computer a nd software ind u stry, p aten ts can be u sed to stren gth en on e's ba r gaining p ower in the case tha t som e other p a rty wants t o b lock access to its own p a t e nts. Syst ems p ro duct industries a re ch a r acterized by the fact tha t the ir p r oduct s incorpora t e numerou s invention s mad e by other p a rties. Since access t o others' patents is essential, firms can b uild up pa t ent port fo lios to have something valuable t o offer in excha n ge. Som aya (2003) t ested this empirically a nd found evidence for this b eh aviour in the com p uter industry. In op en source p rojects by defini t ion it is impossible to b uild up su ch b a r gaining p ower. If a p a t ent h older ch ooses to sue for infringement , op en source projects have n othing t o offer in exchange for a n out of court settlem ent. The resulting 'patent thickets' thr eaten t h e ability of op en source develop er s to improve software (B essen 2002) . Thirdly, the option t o patent softwa r e ra ther than simply 16 In open sou rce software produ ction , the problern of overuse does n ot occur since ther e is n o rivalry in con sumption. Addition al user s can even generat e p ositive ext em al n etwork effects. 17 An example of h ow privati sation in postsocialist econ omies can trigger a 't ragedy of the anti-commons' was given by Heller 1998 . H e started by asking wh y several y ears after the transition 'frorn Marx to rnarket s' stor efronts often r ernain ernpty while srnall kiosks full of goods rnushroorn on the str eet s. H e argu es that the problern is n ot prirnarily a lack of clearly defined property rights, corruption , or disobedien ce of the law, but the way govemment scatt ers p r op erty r ights rather th an creating coh er ent bundles of rights.
18 So far only a few open source develop er s h ave been su ed for p a t ent infringernent (Bessen 2002) . Still the p ot ential threa t rnust n ot b e n eglect ed .
having the copyright on the source may simply increases opportunity costs, thus turning low cost into high cost situations.
When faced with situations where such a tragedy of the anti-commons could arise, governments should not blindly apply orthodox market economics by increasing the scope and sophistication of regulations for private appropriation of intellectual property rights. Regulators should spend their efforts providing tools which help to avoid the 'tragedy of the anti-commons' rather than supplanting copyright protection, on which the viability of the new innovation model depends, with patent protection (Benkler 2002).
Concluding Remarks
Open source software production is a highly successful innovation model. But it is, by far, not a singular case but rather one example of 'virtual communities of innovation'. The purpose of this paper is to inquire under which conditions the new innovation model might work in general.
We a rgu ed tha t a stable solution of the social dilemmas of public good production is grea tly facilitated by the existence of differe nt kinds of motivations and trust. The first order public good consists of direct contributions to the developm ent of op en source software. The second order public good consists of monita ring and sanctioning deviations from the op en source softwa r e n orms. It is n ecessary to m aintain conditional cooperation a nd generalized trust of the b en evolent contributors . E xtrinsically m otivated pa rticipants only contribute to the first order public good in an instrumental way. Their aim is to t ailor the products to their own n eeds, to invest in their r eputation for m onetary purposes or to enla rge the user base for their compleme nta r y products. They can only b e trusted to contribute as long as it is in their b est personal inter est t o do so. Intrinsically m otivated memb ers on t h e other h a nd contribute to t h e first a nd the second order public good. Intrinsic motivations are t wofold, enjoyment-based (fun, public display of ones a bilities) and obligation b ased (following norms of gen eralized reciprocity) . Without these intrinsically motivat ed contributors Coop era tion in op en source software is not sust aina ble since in many cases only their efforts safeguard the community against exploitation by purely self-interest maximizing opportunist s in the presence of a golden opportunity. Thus, potential n ew m ember s w ill only join a community if they can build cognitive trust that ther e exist a sufficient number of intrinsically m otivat ed m ember s who a re willing to contribute to t h e public good s even if the cost s sh ould exceed their p er sonal benefits.
Thus the trustworthiness of a community to a la rge degree depends on the a mount of intrinsic m otivation of a relevant p a rt of its members. We iden tified two conditions that make the presence of this kind of m otivation more likely: Institutional a rra n gements that d o n ot crowd out intrinsic m otivation and low cost situa tions.
On the institutionallevel, licences like copyleft seem to b e a good solution to foster the conditional coop e ration of intrinsically m otivated contributors on the one hand and serve the interests of extrinsieally motivated investors on the other hand (Franek/ Jungwirth 2003). Nevertheless, it seems to be important that the eommereial providers eommit themselves to the norms of the open souree eommunity beyond the obligations of the open souree lieenee. As a eonsequenee, eompanies like Red Hat submit themselves voluntarily to eonstraints beyond eopyleft to maintain eonditional eooperation in the eommunity.
Low eost situations foster trust by making intrinsieally motivated eontributions to the publie goods more likely, thus strengtherring the trustworthiness of the eommunity. Thus, situational and motivational faetors are highly interlinked.
Low eost situations also explain why private ownership of intelleetual property rights is sometimes ineffieient. Private ownership of intellectual property among independent suppliers is less effieient in low-eost situations, (a) eharaeterized by irrerementaland eomplementary innovations or (b) whenever eoneurrenee of design and testing is erueial. In these eases, owners have a right to exclude others from a searee resouree while no one has an effieient right to use it. This eondition not only holds in software produetion but also in other peer produetions of intelleetual goods (Benkler 2002). It does not h old in situations ( e.g. in the pharmaeeutieal industry) wh er e testing a nd m a rket la unehing demand high investments. Further empirieal researeh is needed to shed light on the quantitative dimension of this situational factor.
Even though this n ew innovation model is based on self-regulation in the absenee of a eentral authority, state intervention in the form of a stren gth erring of intelleetual property rights eould very well darnage its sueeess. Patent proteetion ean not only reduee the room in w hieh these self-governed institutions ean flourish. They also turn low eost into high eost situa tions a nd therefore diminish individual w illingness to eontribute to the publie good.
To eonclude, though we are far from fully understanding the interplay between motivational, situational, and institutional faetors whieh make this new innovation model work, open souree software produetion sh ows that even in virtual eommunities with no clear eut boundaries, under eertain eondition s trust and t rustworthiness ean flourish.
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